Committee Report of 1972 which was the result of concern about the prevalence of industrial injuries and the need to rationalise the former piece-meal approach to health and safety legislation.
11 Sections 2-8 contain the duties of an employer. Section 2 covers the general duty to provide safe working conditions for employees, and the qualification that this is subject to what is 'reasonably practicable'. Section 2 also refers to the more specific areas where the duty arises: machinery; handling, storage and transport; information, instruction, training and supervision; and the place of work and the working environment (which is particularly applicable to mental injury in the form of so-called 'stress claims'). Section 2(2)(e) states that the employer must provide: "The provision and maintenance of a working environment for his employees that is, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe, without risks to health, and adequate as regards facilities and arrangements for their welfare at work."
Section 3 imposes a duty in respect of non-employees, so that the obligation is to conduct the undertaking in such a way that non-employees are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. Section 7 imposes a duty on employees to look after their own health and safety. The duties do not depend upon actual harm, but upon the risk of harm. 12 Both physical and mental health are covered by the Act. 13 By virtue of section 15 of the Act, the Secretary of State is empowered to make regulations to deal with specific aspects of health and safety. 14 The Act imposes criminal liability only 15 but an action for damages will lie for breach of health and safety regulations made pursuant to section 15 unless the regulations exclude liability. [1993] 3 All ER 853. 13 Section 47(6) . 14 e.g. The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988 SI 1988 /1657 
Section 47(l)(a) states there is no civil liability; Section 33 imposes criminal penalties 16 Section 47(2).

Mental Health in the Workplace (1) -'Stress* Claims and Workplace Standards and the European Framework Directive on Health and Safety at Work
The European Framework Directive
Article 137 (formerly Article 118) of the Treaty of Rome (as amended) states that the Community shall support the activities of Member States to protect workers' health and safety. Emanating from this is the general directive on health and safety known as the European Framework Directive. 17 In many ways the Directive reflects the employer's non-delegable common law personal obligation in as much as the employer cannot avoid the obligation by appointing external persons to carry out the obligation to 'ensure the safety and health of workers' (Article 5). The Directive applies to a wider category of 'workers' than those who satisfy the definition of 'employee' (Article 3). The main obligations are as follows:
Article 6
1. Within the context of his responsibilities, the employer shall take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including the prevention of occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the necessary organization and means 2. The employer shall implement the measures on the basis of the following general principles of prevention:
(a) avoiding risks;
(b) evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided;
(c) combating the risk at source; (d) adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the design of work places, the choice of work equipment and the choice of working and work places, the choice of work equipment and the choice of working and production methods, with a view, in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at a predetermined work-rate and to reducing their effect on health;
(e) adapting to technical progress; (f) replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;
(g) developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organization of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment;
(h) giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures;
(i) giving appropriate instructions to workers;
Article 7 states that the employer must provide protective and preventive services through the appointment of competent persons. If there are no competent persons within the organization, the employer must enlist competent external services or persons, and these persons must have the necessary capabilities and the necessary means to provide such services. Article 9 requires the employer to assess, respond to, and monitor the response to risks; including reporting of accidents. Workers must be provided with information about safety and health risks and the required
Journal of Mental Health Law
May 2006
protective and preventive measures (Article 10). The employer must provide for consultation with and participation by workers (Article 11) and provide adequate safety training to workers (Article 12). The Directive also imposes obligations on workers such as making proper use of equipment and protective clothing and informing employers of health and safety risks (Article 13). There are a number of more specific 'daughter' Directives 18 emanating from the Framework Directive which have been absorbed into UK law via regulations.
The European standard is therefore that of the competent person, unconstrained by consideration of cost, time or inconvenience.
Regulations
The Indirect effect means that cases would not be restricted to action against state enterprises. 28 This means that it would be possible for the UK health and safety regulatory framework to be interpreted in the light of the Framework Directive or for the Directive to be relied upon directly against a public service employer. It has been argued that some of the provisions of the Directive are sufficiently precise to be directly enforceable, such as a failure to take into consideration a worker's capabilities, to adapt work to an individual worker, or adequately to train a worker (Articles 6(2)(d), and Articled).
29
There is a requirement under European law that there be an effective remedy for breach of European law. 30 The Health and Safety at Work Act and the 1999 Regulations do not admit of a civil remedy. Whilst many physical injuries are covered by the 'six pack' Regulations 31 which do
give rise to a civil law right, the situation with regard to mental injuries, as we will see, is uncertain, and employees have to rely upon the common law, and in particular, on the principles in Sutherland v Hatton^ (discussed below). There is no divergence from Europe here as long as one or more of three situations pertains (discussed below): the Framework Directive does not apply to mental injury; it applies in a different way so as not to demand the standard of the competent person; there is little difference between UK standards and the European standard.
It must be said, however, that if European law treats mental injuries in the same way as physical injuries, then the question arises as to whether there is an effective remedy when the 'reasonably practicable* test is applied. In Cross v Highlands & Islands Enterprise the Scottish Outer House held that the Framework Directive is concerned with general health and safety improvement and that there was no intention to confer an individual (private law) right of action in respect of any breaches. 33 We will re-visit this case later on in this article.
MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WORKPLACE
The common law -negligence liability
For the purposes of employment law, injuries to mental health can be divided into two categories: those induced by trauma and those induced by the wider working environment, but more Mr Walker suffered a nervous breakdown following a significant increase in his workload about which he had complained. When he returned to work after taking a period of sick leave caused by the stress of his work, there had been no steps taken to alleviate his workload and he suffered a relapse and took ill-health retirement. The judge held that the first breakdown was unforeseeable for two reasons. First, the employing authority had no previous experience of workers becoming ill through overwork. Secondly, there was nothing in the personality of Mr Walker to alert them to the possibility of this happening to him. The second breakdown was, for fairly obvious reasons, held to be foreseeable and Mr Walker was successful. 
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and overt signs from the employee or complaints or warnings from others. These indications must be plain to a reasonable employer (para 5).
4. There is no intrinsically stressful work, and employers are entitled to assume that the employee can withstand the normal pressures of the job, unless they know of some particular problem or vulnerability (para 29).
5. The employer can only take steps that are 'reasonable' (defined by the usual negligence standard of care considerations such as the magnitude of the risk of harm occurring, the gravity of the harm and the costs and practicability of preventing it). These steps will depend on the employer's undertaking, including its size, resources and demands that would be made on other employees (paras 32 and 33).
6. If the only reasonable step that can be taken is dismissal, the employer will not be in breach if he allows a willing employee to stay in the job (para 34).
7. An employer who offers a confidential advice service, with referral to counselling or treatment services, is unlikely to be found in breach of duty (paras 17 and 33).
A related and important question concerns how far an employee can consent to pressure at work.
In Smith v Ba/cer 43 the House of Lords rejected the argument that an employee could assume the risk of the employer's negligence. In other words, it is no defence if the risk should reasonably be guarded against. Johnstone v Bloomsbury 44 concerned the excessive hours worked by a junior doctor, which were covered by an express term in the contract. The employee's claim was based upon the implied contractual term that an employer will care for its employees' health and safety, and that this should override any conflicting express term. The case was only before the Court of Appeal on an interlocutory application and the issue was never fully litigated. By a majority, the court held that in principle it was possible to argue that an employee was not always bound by the express terms in his employment contract, but it turned on the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson who made that finding on the basis of the particular wording of the contract, which gave a certain amount of discretion to the employer, and that discretion would have to be exercised reasonably in the light of the implied term. 
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THE CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE
'Reasonably practicable'
The essence of the challenge from the European Commission is that section 2(1) of the 1974 Act which states that it is the duty of every employer to ensure the health, safety and welfare of all his employees at work so far as is 'reasonably practicable' is incompatible with the Directive. There is liability under the Directive for all aspects of health and safety and the only exception is under Article 5(4) which states: "This Directive shall not restrict the option of Member States to provide for the exclusion or the limitation of employers' responsibility where occurrences are due to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances beyond the employers' control, or to exceptional events, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite the exercise of all due care". The Commission's view is that the 'reasonably practicable' qualification in UK legislation does not fit in to this exclusion. 49 No doubt its argument will be that it effectively permits an employer to escape responsibility if he can prove that the sacrifice involved in taking further measures, whether in money, time or trouble, is excessive in some way, and not just in the very exceptional situations envisaged by Article 5(4). injuries arising from an accident at work in which she had slipped on water on an internal flight of stairs and fallen. The allegation was that the employer had shown no evidence of having a system for dealing with spillages and, as such, had failed in its statutory duty to take reasonable precautions to keep the stairs free from water. Her appeal was dismissed on the basis that, whilst it would have been reasonably practicable for the employer to have issued its employees with an instruction to watch out for water spillages, the infrequency of spillages and the fact that the premises were used by employees only, meant its failure to do so did not put it in breach of Reg. However, if we are persuaded by the two statements in Taylor v City of Qlasgow that first, there is an obligation under the reasonably practicable test to make the workplace 'safe', but secondly, under the European Directive, this relates to the generality of the employer's undertaking or parts of the undertaking rather than each individual task, then the standard can, arguably, be regarded as very similar. Further, it is arguable that the Directive itself envisages a more pragmatic approach as one of the principles of prevention, states that measures should be implemented to replace the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous (Article 6(2)(f); emphasis added).
The Directive and mental health
In 
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health at work over the last thirty years has been to reduce to a minimum both work accidents and occupational diseases". 67 The first reference to 'stress' was in a resolution of the European Parliament of 6 May 1994 which urged the Commission to investigate, as a priority, measures in the field of stress, both physical and mental. In Cross, the judge concluded that the reference to 'accidents' and 'diseases' could not include mental health problems, and that this was borne out by the resolution of the European Parliament which post-dated the Directive. However, the Object of the Directive states that ..."it contains general principles concerning the prevention of occupational risks...." (Article 1) and this expression is repeated at various points throughout, so arguably the wording of the Directive itself is wide enough to cover mental health. In addition, Article 6(2)(g) refers to the development of an overall prevention policy which covers (inter alia) "social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment", which suggests that regard should be had to risks over and above those of a physical nature. A similar argument can be made in respect of Article 6(2)(d) which requires adaptation of work to the individual "in particular, to alleviating monotonous work" which suggests that there is more than the physical element of work under consideration. The fact that 'stress' can cause physical injury is another factor that supports the view that a demarcation between the two aspects of injury is not appropriate. 
MENTAL HEALTH UNDER A EUROPEAN REGIME -WHAT STANDARD
OF CARE?
The reasonable employer under common law
The standard is that as outlined under the Sutherland v Hatton principles. Is it possible to argue that the differences between physical and mental health mean that, effectively statutory liability should not demand a higher standard than this? There are two potential key differences between physical and mental injury. First, the risk of mental injury depends upon the psychological differences between individual workers. Although there can be some deviation in terms of physical resilience, 76 generally speaking it is possible to point to fairly standard risks of someone being physically injured. It might be thought at first glance that cases such as Paris v Stepney 11 do not support this view; on the contrary, the physical disability was obvious to the employer. The other important plank of the reasonable employer test is that much of the onus falls on the employee to alert the employer to the risk to his or her mental health. Although the Court of Appeal regarded the nature and extent of the work done as relevant to the foreseeability of injury, the other key factor was that there should be clear indications of risk from the employee, and, further, it was stated that a reasonable employer is entitled to assume that the employee can withstand the normal pressures of the job unless he knows of some particular problem or vulnerability. This does not give the employer carte blanche to overload an employee with work; if this happens then the employee does not have to show any special vulnerability. However, if the workload is 'normal' then the onus falls on the employee to demonstrate this vulnerability. A 'normal' workload should be able to be established by fairly objective means, albeit that there would have to be job-specific (as opposed to employee-specific) criteria employed. It is instructive that of the four appeals heard by the Court of Appeal in Sutherland v Hatton the only one that succeeded was the case of an administrator who, it was shown, had been required to work grossly excessive hours over the 37 hours per week required by her contract of employment. 78 There are other objective markers that can be used to measure the risk of stress-related injury, such as evidence of workers not taking meal breaks, and explicit changes in job content, management structures and methods of working/ 9 However, we need to contemplate the possibility that, either we accommodate the argument that the Framework Directive applies to mental health, or a new European Directive is enacted in accordance with the Community strategy on health and safety at work. 80 In either case we have to ascertain whether European standards will be higher than those under UK law. If the UK loses the case currently brought by the Commission, the reasonable practicability test will be replaced by the Article 6(2)(d) states that one of the principles of prevention is for employers to adapt work to the individual. Not only is this not precise, but in the mental health context it could be said that it is impracticable to do this, not reasonably impracticable. The advantage of the above argument that practicability rather than reasonable practicability is key, is that the European standard of the competent person will be much easier to satisfy. If it is impracticable then it is not within the scope of the competent person's ability. Similarly Article 6(2)(g), which states that employers should develop a coherent overall prevention policy covering technology, organization of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment, is too vague to be enforceable, and gives rise to the same problems as Article (2)(d).
Unlike the case of physical health, therefore, preventative measures in the case of mental health, will usually be of a general nature only, such as risk assessments and the monitoring of those known to be at risk. A future European Directive on mental health in the workplace might be more precise and informative, although arguably the nature of mental health and workplace 'stress' might mean that, as at present, the imposition of 'higher standards' results in a situation where the employer who implements reasonably practicable measures, and the competent person, are the same characters in the context of mental injury because they are both constrained by individual psychologies and therefore by what is practicable. 
